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Int J Audit. 2018;22:503–521.The purpose of this study is to validate the drivers of voluntary audit in small compa-
nies identified in previous research and uncover additional determinants related to
agency conflicts with owners. For our research we use the German institutional set-
ting, documented in the literature as being very different from its Anglo‐Saxon equiv-
alent. Based on a random sample of 405 small companies responding to a postal
questionnaire survey, we find that the proportion of owners not involved in manage-
ment, the subsidiary status of a company, a company's legal form, and the importance
of financial statements' information to management activities all increase the likeli-
hood of voluntary audit. In contrast, firms that outsource accounting tasks to an
external expert are less likely to opt for voluntary audit, suggesting that an external
expert's involvement substitutes for an external audit. In addition, owing to the
absence of a statutory audit history for small companies in Germany, we find that vol-
untary audits are less common compared with findings from previous studies.
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Agency theory, auditor choice, external audit1 | INTRODUCTION
In this study based on small German companies, we examine factors
affecting the owner‐manager's decision to hire an auditor. This study
advances our understanding of voluntary auditing for small companies
in an economically important bank‐dominated code law country, Ger-
many, where voluntary audit drivers have not previously been exam-
ined. Because of its exceptionally high exemption thresholds,
Germany makes possible the broadest examination of voluntary
auditing choices in Europe. Indeed, because most governance research
has examined US firms, Carcello, Hermanson, and Ye (2011) call for
more focus on non‐US firms, particularly firms in Continental Europe.
Those papers that have examined non‐US firms have tended to study
other countries that follow Anglo‐Saxon traditions of governance (e.g.,
Australia, Canada, the UK).- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
e Creative Commons Attribution Li
ting Published by John Wiley & SoThe European Commission has recently adopted a “think small
first” approach, which attempts to reduce the administrative require-
ments for small companies. This approach assumes that small entities
carry a disproportionately high burden of administrative costs, cover-
ing, for instance, the preparation of full financial statements and
auditing. Despite the need for research data to support political posi-
tions concerning costs and benefits or underlying reasons behind small
firms' economic decisions, the evidence regarding private companies'
financial accounting and auditing decisions remains very limited.
Although 99% of all businesses are small and medium sized (Euro-
pean Union [EU], 2014), possibly because it is more complex to access
private companies' data, their voluntary audit drivers have been exam-
ined far less often than the factors for audit quality in the case of pub-
licly listed companies. This lack of research evidence may, therefore,
lead to inappropriate generalization as a result of findings from- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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504 WEIK ET AL.previous research studies having been gathered primarily from data
based on publicly listed companies or Anglo‐Saxon accounting set-
tings. According to the synthesis of prior auditing research on private
companies, Langli and Svanström (2014) argue that:The differences that exist between private and public
companies are so large and fundamental that without
careful consideration we cannot rely on findings for
public companies when we want to understand the role
of auditing in private companies.Responding to this call for additional evidence on voluntary audit
drivers and accounting processes in private companies, we gathered
survey questionnaire data from 405 usable responses by small private
companies in Germany regarding financial statements' information for
the financial year ending 2011. The data centered around questions
examining voluntary audit drivers that relate to: (i) agency conflicts
with owners; (ii) agency conflicts with lenders; (iii) the importance of
financial statements for management activities; and (iv) the
outsourcing of accounting tasks.
Our data show that voluntary audits are considerably less com-
mon among German firms than they are with firms in other countries.
While previous studies have found voluntary audit ranging between
26% and 80% (see Table 5) of businesses, we find that only 12% of
our sample companies opt for a voluntary audit. Our results indicate
that managers from countries where they have been subject to man-
datory audit regimes value the cost and benefits resulting from a vol-
untary audit very differently from those who have not, demonstrating
that the voluntary audit decision is likely to be influenced by previous
habits (Niemi, Kinnunen, Ojala, & Troberg, 2012; Oliver, 1991).
Regarding the drivers of voluntary audit, in line with previous
research, we find that the proportion of company owners who are
not involved in management (e.g., Collis, 2010, 2012; Seow, 2001;
Tauringana & Clarke, 2000) and the importance that managers place
on accounting information for management accounting purposes
(Collis, 2010, 2012; Collis, Jarvis, & Skerratt, 2004; Niemi et al.,
2012) increase the likelihood of an auditor being hired voluntarily. In
contrast with previous studies on voluntary audit, we cannot find sup-
port for the status as a family firm (e.g., Collis, 2010; Collis et al.,
2004), ownership dispersion (Dedman, Kausar, & Lennox, 2014), or
leverage (Carey, Simnett, & Tanewski, 2000; Dedman et al., 2014;
Tauringana & Clarke, 2000) impacting on a firm's voluntary audit deci-
sion. However, extending previous research, we do find evidence that
the legal form in which a company operates, the status as a subsidiary,
and outsourcing are further factors impacting on a manager's volun-
tary audit decision. By further examining the professional qualifica-
tions of those to whom accounting tasks are outsourced, we provide
evidence that outsourcing accounting tasks to an external tax advisor
decreases the likelihood of a voluntary audit, whereas outsourcing
accounting tasks to an external auditor increases the likelihood of a
voluntary audit. Subject to the professional qualifications of those to
whom financial accounting tasks are outsourced, this result suggests
that auditing can play a substitutive or a complementary role.
Our study contributes to the literature as follows. First, it vali-
dates earlier research findings from other jurisdictions in an institu-
tional setting that has been documented in the literature as beingvery different from the Anglo‐Saxon regime (Alexander, Britton,
Jorissen, Hoogendoorn, & van Mourik, 2014) and which lacks a statu-
tory audit history for small companies. Second, our study takes a more
profound approach than earlier studies (e.g., Niemi et al., 2012) in
examining the link between the voluntary audit decision and
outsourcing accounting tasks. Considering the different professional
qualifications of those to whom accounting tasks are outsourced,
our study is the first to discuss the complementary versus substitutive
role of auditing in a small company setting. Third, our study contrib-
utes by examining drivers of voluntary audit related to agency con-
flicts with owners (the legal form of the company, the existence of a
supervisory board, and the status as a subsidiary) that have not yet
been documented in prior research. By investigating the impact of
nonmandated supervisory boards on voluntary audit decisions in small
companies, we also add to the literature (on listed firms) discussing the
complementary/substitutive relationship between governance mecha-
nisms and external auditing.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we provide a brief description of the institutional and regulatory set-
ting (Germany). We discuss relevant prior literature and develop our
hypotheses in Section 3, followed in Section 4 by a description of
the data and models used in our empirical tests. Results from these
tests are reported in Section 5. Thereafter, our paper concludes with
a brief summary of the main findings and implications in Section 6.2 | INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY
SETTING
Auditing regulation in the member states of the European Community
(EC) or the EU has to comply with EC/EU directives. The Fourth Direc-
tive 78/660/EEC according to Article 51.1(a) in conjunction with Arti-
cle 1 required limited liability companies to have their accounts
audited by one or more persons authorized to carry out such audits.
However, according to Article 51.2, member states of the EC were
permitted to provide an option enabling qualifying companies to
forego the statutory audit. According to Article 11 in conjunction with
Article 12, such qualifying companies were those that did not exceed
two out of three size thresholds—only the maximum thresholds that
member states could set were specified—regarding total assets, turn-
over, and the average number of employees in two consecutive finan-
cial years. In 2013 the Fourth Directive was replaced by Directive
2013/34/EU. This new directive according to Article 34.1 in conjunc-
tion with Article 1 requires limited liability companies that are
medium‐sized, large, or of public interest to have their accounts
audited. As with requirements from the Fourth Directive, there could
also be companies that do not need to have their accounts audited,
therefore, unless they are of public interest or, according to Article
3.2 in conjunction with Article 3.10, exceed two out of three size
thresholds regarding total assets, turnover, and the average number
of employees in two consecutive financial years. As can be seen,
depending on member states' interpretations of the directives, differ-
ent settings can exist within the EU, first due to various definitions
of the size criteria for small companies and second due to a possible
option for qualifying companies to forego a statutory audit.
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(HGB) companies are classified as small if they do not exceed two out
of three size thresholds in two consecutive years (total assets:
€6,000,000; turnover: €12,000,000; average number of employees:
50).1 In Germany the financial statements of limited liability companies
(e.g., Aktiengesellschaften [AG], Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien
[KGaA], Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung [GmbH]), and certain
commercial partnerships with limited liability (e.g., Gesellschaft mit
beschränkter Haftung & Co. Kommanditgesellschaft [GmbH & Co. KG])
that do not qualify as small have to be audited (§ 316 (1) HGB and §
264a HGB). So, Germany uses the EU option to exempt small compa-
nies from statutory audits and thereby sets the thresholds at the EU
maximum. Since small companies in Germany account for about 89%
of all firms (Collis, 2010) and a statutory audit requirement may be
associated with significant costs as well as limited benefits for small
companies (Directive 2013/34/EU), the audit exemption regime is of
great economic importance.
Literature states that, owing to a higher demand for control mech-
anisms, the accounting profession developed earlier in countries
where equity financing plays a major role, as opposed to countries
where banks are the major providers of finance for business activities,
and that the accounting profession's impact on local financial reporting
practices is accordingly larger in countries where the accounting pro-
fession is well organized than in countries with smaller and later devel-
oped professional organizations (Alexander et al., 2014). Owing to its
traditional emphasis on the importance of banks for business financ-
ing, Germany's accounting profession is not comparable with that in
the UK (Haller, 2003; Nobes & Parker, 2016).2 As opposed to the
UK, the German auditing profession has a rather short tradition (Alex-
ander et al., 2014; Haller, 2003) and is comparably weak (Nobes &
Parker, 2016). In Germany, a statutory annual audit was first intro-
duced for AGs and KGaAs only in 1931, whereas GmbHs have been
subject to a mandatory audit regime only since 1985, when EU
requirements were implemented in German law (Eierle, 2005). For
GmbH & Co. KGs a statutory audit requirement was implemented only
as late as 2000 (Eierle, 2005). Moreover, audit exemptions have
always been very generous in Germany. Small companies in the legal
form of the GmbH or the GmbH & Co. KG (the major legal forms for
small and medium‐sized firms with limited liability in Germany; see
Table 1) have never been subject to a mandatory audit regime, and
small AGs/KGaAs have been exempted from a mandatory audit for
over 30 years (Eierle, 2005; Haller, 2003). Regarding the exemption
criteria for small companies, Germany has always implemented the
maximum size criteria possible under the EU accounting directives.
Accordingly, the audit exemption regime in Germany is very dif-
ferent from those covered by previous studies on voluntary audit,
such as in the UK (e.g. Collis, 2012; Dedman et al., 2014) or FinlandTABLE 1 Legal form choices of small companies with limited liability
in Germany
Legal form Proportion (%)
AG/KGaA 1.05
GmbH/GmbH & Co. KG 98.95
Analysis based on the population of 733,949 companies used for our sam-
ple selection; see Section 4.1 for further details.(Niemi et al., 2012; Ojala, Collis, Niemi, Kinnunen, & Troberg, 2016),
where many small companies have only recently been relieved from
the onus of a mandatory audit regime after an increase in size criteria.
As institutional theory emphasizes the role of habit on organizations'
attempts to obtain stability and legitimacy (Oliver, 1991), firms' deci-
sions to opt for voluntary audit may be driven by previous practices
and resulting expectations from their stakeholders (Niemi et al.,
2012). Furthermore, unlike the UK, Germany has always implemented
the maximum size criteria possible under the EU accounting directives
and has, compared with Finland (total assets: €100,000; turnover:
€200,000; average number of employees: 3 [Ojala et al., 2016]), still
considerably higher thresholds for small companies' audit exemptions.
In this respect, Germany provides a very different setting from that in
the UK and Finland, for example, and is, moreover, free from the cus-
tomary statutory audit history present in other countries.
Furthermore, unlike the UK's financial environment, accounting
and taxation in Germany have traditionally been very strongly linked
(Alexander et al., 2014; Schildbach, 2009), and consequently smaller
companies usually prepare only one set of financial statements for
financial accounting and tax purposes (Haller, 2003; Loitz, 2014).
Owing to this strong linkage, tax advisors play a crucial role in provid-
ing accounting services (Loitz, 2014). Accordingly, it is important to
note that the audit and tax professions are strongly regulated in Ger-
many, and to provide tax advisory services one must first pass a spe-
cial state examination, § 35 StBerG (tax advisory act). In addition,
financial statements prepared for tax purposes are subject to the tax
enforcement regime, which is the case even if companies prepare only
one set of financial statements for financial accounting and tax pur-
poses. Since these factors might impact on a company's demand for
voluntary audit, this is a further reason why Germany provides an
important setting for studying voluntary audit.3 | PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The role of financial reporting differs between public and private com-
panies. While public companies' financial reports serve the investment
decision needs of financial markets, in private companies the main
decisions relate to taxation and dividend distribution (Ball &
Shivakumar, 2005). According to agency theory, the demand for
auditing arises from information asymmetries and conflicts of interest
between principals and agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Watts &
Zimmerman, 1986). Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) sug-
gests that audited financial reports play an important role in
supporting relationships with investors as well as other principals
who are distant from the actions of management and cannot, there-
fore, otherwise verify company information. In small companies, those
principals include external shareholders, lenders, and suppliers (Power,
1997), who may also require audited accounts.3.1 | Agency conflicts with owners
Conflicts of interest between owners (principals) and managers
(agents), as well as information asymmetries arising from the
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(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Provision of
financial reports can reduce these information asymmetries. However,
owing to conflicts of interest, it cannot be guaranteed that manage-
ment will report truthfully, and hence the need for an external audit
is established (Gjesdal, 1981). For small businesses it can be argued
that owners are often involved in management, thereby suggesting a
lower level of agency costs resulting from the separation of ownership
and control (Carsberg, Page, Sindall, & Waring, 1985; Collis et al.,
2004; Collis & Jarvis, 2000); this in turn limits the need, therefore,
for an independent assurance on financial statements (Directive
2013/34/EU). Nevertheless, one must be aware that small companies
are heterogeneous in nature, and not all of them are owner‐managed.
Thus, a complete absence of owner‐related agency conflicts in small
firms is very unlikely (Coppens & Peek, 2005; Page, 1984), which
may, therefore, reveal a need for audited financial accounting informa-
tion. In line with this argument, previous research analyzing small firms
in the UK finds that a voluntary audit is more likely for small compa-
nies with shareholders who are not involved in management (Collis,
2010), have a higher number of nondirector shareholders (Seow,
2001), or lower managerial share ownership (Tauringana & Clarke,
2000). However, there are also studies that could not find a significant
relationship between the demand for a voluntary audit and the exis-
tence of external owners without access to management information
(e.g., Collis, 2010, for Danish companies) or which even found a signif-
icant negative relationship (e.g., Collis, 2012, for [non‐micro] small
companies in the UK). Based on our theoretical arguments herein
and previous research findings from other countries, therefore, we
propose the following hypothesis:H1a. Voluntary audit is more likely the higher the pro-
portion of owners who are not involved in management.Additionally, within the German context, Kaya (2010) argues that
varying levels of information asymmetry and resulting agency conflicts
between shareholders and management also depend on a company's
legal form, which gives rise to differences in owners' information
rights. In Germany, shareholders of GmbHs (and similarly GmbH &
Co. KGs) have more comprehensive information rights than the share-
holders of an AG (Kaya, 2010), which in the latter case may increase
the demand for voluntary audit. This leads us to the following
hypothesis:H1b. Voluntary audit is more likely for companies oper-
ating in the legal form of an AG.Alternatively, discussion in prior literature regarding larger and
listed companies looks at whether an external audit plays a comple-
mentary or substitutive role to internal corporate governance mecha-
nisms (e.g., Hay, Knechel, & Ling, 2008; Knechel & Willekens, 2006;
Zaman, Hudaib, & Haniffa, 2011). Since outside directors and audit
committee members will be concerned about their personal exposure
and financial loss that could result from litigation in the event of man-
agement fraud or some other scandal related to the organization, they
may demand external assurance. In line with this argument, research
covering listed companies finds a positive relationship between the
strength of corporate governance mechanisms (such as the existenceof an audit committee) and audit fees, thereby confirming the com-
plementary role of an external audit (Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, &
Riley Jr., 2002; Hay et al., 2008; Knechel & Willekens, 2006; Zaman
et al., 2011). However, Knechel and Willekens (2006) argue that con-
trols are complementary only as long as they are voluntary. Since
mandated controls do not result from an endogenous demand for
control, stakeholders will balance the externally imposed
(nonefficient) requirement for internal control mechanisms against
the endogenous demand for other forms of control (such as an exter-
nal audit; Knechel & Willekens, 2006). In line with this argument,
Knechel and Willekens (2006) find in the case of Belgian listed com-
panies that audit fees are lower when a company discloses a rela-
tively high level of compliance risk management and interpret this
result as suggesting that auditing is complementary only if controls
are nonmandated. Although in prior literature the evidence on the
substitutive/complementary role of external auditing is discussed only
for listed companies, the underlying rationale applies equally to small
nonlisted firms and their demands for voluntary audit. In the comple-
mentary view, the existence of governance mechanisms (such as a
supervisory board) in small companies may lead to higher demands
for voluntary audit. However, according to the substitution view, a
higher demand for voluntary audit could be expected only if the
implementation of a supervisory board is nonmandated (which is
the case for GmbHs or GmbH & Co. KGs; AGs are, in contrast,
required by law to set up a supervisory board). This discussion on
the complementary versus substitutive role of an audit leads us to
our next hypotheses:H1c. Voluntary audit is more likely if the company has a
supervisory board.
H1d. Voluntary audit is more likely if the company has a
nonmandated supervisory board.Furthermore, the existence of a parent company is predicted to
increase the demand for external audit. The arguments for this are
twofold. First, minority shareholders may require external assurance
to counterbalance the power of the parent company. Second, the
demand could also arise from the parent company's need to control
internal decisions adequately by using its power to call for external
audit. This view is supported by evidence provided by Hay et al.
(2008), who find for listed companies in New Zealand that the exis-
tence of a major shareholder is positively associated with demands
for external auditing services. Applying this rationale to private firms
and the voluntary audit setting, it could be concluded, therefore, that
small companies controlled by a parent company would be more likely
to have voluntary audits. Accordingly, we provide an extension to pre-
vious research3 on small companies regarding the voluntary audit deci-
sion, in assuming that subsidiaries controlled by a parent undertaking
reveal a higher demand for an external audit,4 which leads us to the
following hypothesis:H1e. Voluntary audit is more likely if the company is a
subsidiary.Prior research also suggests and finds for the UK that the number
of owners impacts on agency costs and, therefore, increases the
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larger number of owners are more likely to suffer problems of commu-
nication and coordination. This might lead to disputes among share-
holders and result in more severe agency conflicts between the
owners and management, which could be mitigated by an audit of
financial statements. In contrast, if small companies are family owned,
conflicts of interests between family members are assumed to be less
pronounced due to a higher level of trust and consequently lower
agency conflicts (Collis et al., 2004; Corten, Steijvers, & Lybaert,
2015). However, Corten et al. (2015) also argue that even in small
and family‐owned companies agency problems can exist because of
an entrenchment effect (similar to Carey & Tanewski, 2013). In line
with these conflicting arguments, empirical results from previous
research are mixed. While Collis and coworkers (Collis, 2010; Collis
et al., 2004) find for the UK that small companies that are wholly fam-
ily owned reveal a lower demand for voluntary audit, this could not be
confirmed by Collis (2012). In contrast to these findings, Corten et al.
(2015) hypothesize and provide evidence for US private family firms
(possibly because of entrenching) that the demand for reviews and
compilations increases in the case of second‐generation family firms.
Based on this discussion, we state the following hypotheses:H1f. Voluntary audit is more likely the greater the num-
ber of owners.
H1g. Voluntary audit is more/less likely if the company
is a family firm.3.2 | Agency conflicts with lenders
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that agency costs also arise
from outside financing. Privately held companies do not have direct
access to the capital markets, which makes them turn instead to
debt financing (Berger & Udell, 1998). In basic terms, if a firm uses
debt capital, managers acting in the interest of the firms' owners will
have an incentive to undertake profitable business activities at the
expense of outside investors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Because
lenders anticipate such managerial behavior they price‐protect them-
selves by, for instance, charging higher interest rates. Accordingly,
the best solution for both parties (managers and lenders) is to
engage an external auditor in order to reduce agency costs. This is
especially relevant for small entities that are quoted in the literature
as being more likely to suffer from credit rationing (Berger & Udell,
2006), partly because they are “often acutely informationally
opaque” (Berger & Udell, 1998). In line with these arguments, previ-
ous literature provides evidence that small companies are more likely
to demand a voluntary audit: (i) if financial statements are given to
the bank (Collis, 2003); (ii) if banks require audited accounts (Collis,
2008, 2012); (iii) if bank debt exists (Collis et al., 2004; Niemi
et al., 2012); and (iv) if the company's leverage is high (Carey et al.,
2000; Dedman et al., 2014; Tauringana & Clarke, 2000). Further-
more, literature also shows that a voluntary audit reduces the cost
of debt (Blackwell, Noland, & Winters, 1998; Kim, Simunic, Stein, &
Yi, 2011; Minnis, 2011). Based on the foregoing discussion, we pro-
pose the following hypothesis:H2. Voluntary audit is more likely the higher a
company's debt ratio.3.3 | Importance of financial statements for
management activities
Regardless of a company's size, managers have an interest in the
integrity of financial information because of its support in facilitating
better decisions. To reduce costs resulting from poor decisions, man-
agers establish and maintain internal and external control systems to
provide assurance regarding the integrity of financial information not
only for external stakeholders but also for themselves (Jensen &
Payne, 2003). Since small companies often lack professional account-
ing competence and control mechanisms (Collis et al., 2004), engaging
an external auditor may reduce the risk of misstatements and thus
ensure the correctness of financial statement information (Abdel‐
khalik, 1993). Thus, an external audit is expected to substitute for poor
internal controls (Wallace, 1984). The more important managers per-
ceive financial information to be in operating and controlling the activ-
ities of their companies, the more they might value an audit.
Consistent with this argument, Collis et al. (2004) find for small com-
panies in the UK that higher levels of agreement on an audit's ability
to provide both a beneficial check on internal books/records and
improvement to the quality of information are positively associated
with the demand for a voluntary audit. These results are confirmed
by Niemi et al. (2012) for small companies in Finland and a follow up
study by Collis (2010) for Denmark and the UK (albeit that in the UK
agreement exists only for an audit's ability to improve the quality of
information). In a further study, Collis (2012) found weak support in
the case of micro companies (but not nonmicro companies) for the
hypothesis that demand for a voluntary audit is positively associated
with the reported agreement that auditing acts as a check on account-
ing systems and records. Nevertheless, Collis (2012) could not confirm
the hypothesis either for micro or for nonmicro small companies that
voluntary audit is positively associated with the claim that audit
improves the quality of financial information. This discussion of the lit-
erature leads us to our next hypothesis:H3. Voluntary audit is more likely if financial statement
information is considered very important for manage-
ment activities.3.4 | Outsourcing
It is well known that the smallest companies cannot afford in‐house
accounting expertise and typically outsource their accounting function
(Berry, Sweeting, & Goto, 2006; Everaert, Sarens, & Rommel, 2007;
Kirby & King, 1997). Owing to limited resources and lack of compe-
tence regarding financial accounting tasks (e.g., bookkeeping, prepara-
tion of financial statements, or preparation of tax returns) in small
companies (Gooderham, Tobiassen, Døving, & Nordhaug, 2004), these
services are often outsourced to external experts (Niemi et al., 2012).
Germany's accounting profession is not comparable to that in the UK
or the USA (Haller, 2003), with accounting tasks therefore being
outsourced to those qualified either as auditors or tax advisors. Both
professions are strongly regulated in Germany, implying, for instance,
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nation (§ 1 WPO [Public Accountant Act]; § 35 StBerG). However,
compared with tax advisors, auditors have broader levels of compe-
tence covering both tax advice and auditing. Thus, while auditors are
also qualified to provide tax advice, tax advisors are not allowed to
provide an audit. Owing to the strong alignment between financial
accounting and taxation in Germany, accounting tasks (such as book-
keeping, the preparation of financial statements, and preparation of
tax declaration) are often outsourced to tax advisors (Loitz, 2014). Pre-
vious studies investigating the association between outsourcing
accounting activities and the demand for voluntary audit suggest that
the use of an external accountant leads to problems of moral hazard.
This could in turn necessitate hiring an auditor to provide assurance
that the external accountant has not behaved opportunistically (Niemi
et al., 2012). Accordingly, Niemi et al. (2012) find for a sample of Finish
small companies that owner‐managers, who reveal a higher level of
agreement for the importance of financial accounting services pro-
vided by an external accountant, are more likely to demand a volun-
tary audit. However, if tax advisory services provided by the external
accountant to the company are perceived as important, Niemi et al.
(2012) find that the demand for a voluntary audit decreases. An expla-
nation supporting this negative association suggests that the involve-
ment of external experts with the necessary resources and
professional qualifications provides managers as well as the company's
stakeholders with additional assurances regarding the integrity of
financial information, thus decreasing demand for a voluntary audit.
Accordingly, Ojala, Niskanen, Collis, and Pajunen (2014) find that, if
there is high trust in the external accountant, the benefits of having
an audit decrease. Thus, if external experts are perceived as reliable
and competent, outsourcing accounting tasks may substitute for an
external audit. These arguments, together with the findings of Bennett
and Robson (1999) that external accountants are held in positions of
high trust by their customers, lead to the following hypothesis:TABLE
Total p
Size cl
Stratum
Numbe
Propor
Numbe
Questi
Questi
Reject
• a st
• gen
• con
Usable
UsableH4a. Voluntary audit is less likely if accounting tasks are
outsourced to an external expert.Owing to different levels of professional qualification and incon-
sistent findings in previous literature, we also examine whether or2 Sample development
opulation
ass 1
defined by total assets (TA) TA ≤ €350,000
r of companies by stratum 424,391
tion of total population (%) 57.8
r of companies randomly selected 2,000
onnaires sent out
onnaires returned
ed questionnaires, due to:
atutory audit
eral partner in a limited liability partnership
tradictory information
responses
responses by stratum 112not different professional qualification levels of those to whom book-
keeping, financial statement preparation, or tax return preparation are
outsourced has an effect on the voluntary audit decision. This gives
rise to hypotheses H4b and H4c:H4b. Voluntary audit is less likely if accounting tasks are
outsourced to an external tax advisor.
H4c. Voluntary audit is less likely if accounting tasks are
outsourced to an external auditor.4 | DATA AND MODEL
4.1 | Data
Because publicly available information on the voluntary audit of small
companies is lacking, our research data have been gathered via a
postal questionnaire survey5 sent to 6,000 managers of small6 limited
liability companies/partnerships asking them for their voluntary audit
decisions covering the financial year ending 2011. The firms contacted
were chosen from 733,949 small firms on the DAFNE database using
a disproportionate stratified random sampling reflecting company
sizes.7 As most small businesses are micro‐entities in Germany, we
used this sample selection procedure to ensure that enough small
companies of different sizes were included in our study, since prior lit-
erature shows that the voluntary audit demand increases with com-
pany size (e.g., Collis, 2012; Collis et al., 2004; Niemi et al., 2012).
Capital market‐oriented companies, firms belonging to the accounting,
auditing, or tax consultancy industry, and companies serving as gen-
eral partners in limited liability partnerships were excluded from the
sample. We conducted the survey in summer (June and July) 2013.
In total, we received back 443 questionnaires, 24 of which had to be
rejected since respondents indicated that they were subject to statu-
tory audit. One questionnaire was rejected due to the company's sta-
tus as a general partner in a limited liability partnership, and a further
13 were excluded from the analysis due to contradictory information.
Ultimately, 405 usable responses were received, giving a response rate
of 6.75%. The sample development is shown inTable 2. The validity of733,949
2 3
€350,000 < TA ≤ €2,000,000 TA > €2,000,000
236,590 72,968
32.2 9.9
2,000 2,000
6,000
443
24
1
13
405 (6.75%)
152 141
TABLE 3 Description of variables
Variable Description Hypothesis
Exp.
sign
Dependent variable
VOLAUDIT Binary variable receiving
the value of 1 if the
company chooses to
have a voluntary audit
and 0 otherwise
Explanatory variables
NONOWNERMGT Proportion of the owners
of the company who
are not involved in the
management of the
company
H1a +
LEGAL Binary variable receiving
the value of 1 if the
company is a stock
company and 0
otherwise
H1b +
BOARD Binary variable receiving
the value of 1 if there
is a supervisory board
in the company and 0
otherwise
H1c +
NONMANDBOARD Binary variable receiving
the value of 1 if there
is a nonmandated
supervisory board in
the company and 0
otherwise
H1d +
SUBSIDIARY Binary variable receiving
the value of 1 if the
company is a
subsidiary and 0
otherwise
H1e +
NO_OF_OWNERS Natural logarithm of the
number of the owners
of the company
H1f +
FAMILY Binary variable receiving
the value of 1 if the
company is a family
firm and 0 otherwise
H1g ?
DEBT_RATIO Total debt divided by
total assets
H2 +
IMPORTANCE Binary variable receiving
the value of 1 if
financial statement
information is very
important for
management activities
and 0 otherwise
H3 +
OUTSOURCE
OUTSOURCE_EXP Binary variable receiving
the value of 1 if
financial accounting
tasks are outsourced to
an external expert (tax
advisor or auditor) and
0 otherwise.
H4a −
OUTSOURCE_TAXADV Binary variable receiving
the value of 1 if
financial accounting
tasks are outsourced to
an external tax advisor
and 0 otherwise
H4b −
OUTSOURCE_AUD Binary variable receiving
the value of 1 if
H4c −
(Continues)
WEIK ET AL. 509responses is supported by the fact that 94.3% of the questionnaires
were completed by the manager or the firm's head of accounting.
Owing to the imputation of some missing variables, as is cus-
tomary in survey research (Allee & Yohn, 2009), all of the 405 usable
responses were featured in our analyses.8 A multiple imputation pro-
cedure was applied that provided five data samples. The analyses
(i.e., the descriptive statistics, correlations, and binary logistic regres-
sions) were carried out for each of these data samples. The overall
estimates are the arithmetic means of estimates for each of these
data samples (Equation 1). The corresponding overall variances
(Equation 4) are a combination of the average within‐imputation
variances (Equation 2) and the between‐imputation variances
(Equation 3), with (1 + 1/N) as an adjustment for finite N (Little &
Rubin, 2002; Rubin, 1987).
eN ¼ 1N ∑
N
n¼1
ben (1)
σ2 withinð ÞN ¼
1
N
∑
N
n¼1
σ2n (2)
σ2 betweenð ÞN ¼
1
N−1
∑
N
n¼1
ben−eNð Þ2 (3)
σ2 totalð ÞN ¼ σ2 withinð ÞN þ 1þ
1
N
 
σ2 betweenð ÞN (4)
4.2 | Models
To test our hypothesized relationships between the decision for vol-
untary audit and agency factors (resulting from agency conflicts with
owners and lenders), the importance of financial statements for man-
agement activities, and outsourcing, we use the following logistic
regression model (model 1):
Prob VOLAUDITið Þ ¼ 11þ e−Z (5)
where
Z ¼ α0 þ α1NONOWNERMGTi þ α2LEGALi þ α3BOARDi
þ α4SUBSIDIARYi þ α5NO OF OWNERSi þ α6FAMILYi
þ α7DEBT RATIOi þ α8IMPORTANCEi þ α9OUTSOURCEi
þ α10SIZEi þ α11NEGEQi þ α12INDUSTRY 2i þ α13INDUSTRY 3i
þ α14INDUSTRY 4i
In addition, as the variables BOARD and NONMANDBOARD are
expected to be highly correlated, we run an additional model (model
2) to test H1d where we replace the variable BOARD by the variable
NONMANDBOARD with all other variables remaining the same.
All variables used in the tests are described inTable 3. The depen-
dent variable VOLAUDIT is a dummy variable coded 1 if the company's
2011 financial statements were audited and 0 otherwise. To test the
relationship between the demand for voluntary audit and agency con-
flicts with firms' owners (H1), we include six variables in both of our
models. The status as a family firm9 is captured by a dummy variable
(FAMILY). While the direction for FAMILY is uncertain, all the other
TABLE 3 (Continued)
Variable Description Hypothesis
Exp.
sign
financial accounting
tasks are outsourced to
an external auditor and
0 otherwise
Control variables
SIZE Natural logarithm of total
assets
+
NEGEQ Binary variable receiving
the value of 1 if the
equity is negative and
0 otherwise
?
INDUSTRYa
INDUSTRY_1: Public and private utilities
INDUSTRY_2: Wholesale and retail
trade
INDUSTRY_3: Service
INDUSTRY_4: Manufacturing,
construction and
transportation
?
aThe four industries are binary variables with public and private utilities
used as the base group.
510 WEIK ET AL.variables related to agency conflicts with owners are hypothesized to
be positively associated with the demand for a voluntary audit. These
are the proportion of company owners who are not involved in a
company's management (NONOWNERMGT), the company operating
in the legal form of an AG, which is coded 1 and 0 otherwise (LEGAL),
the existence of a supervisory board (only model 1), which is coded 1
if a supervisory board is implemented and 0 otherwise (BOARD), the
existence of a nonmandated supervisory board (only model 2), which
is coded 1 if the company has a nonmandated supervisory board and
0 otherwise (NONMANDBOARD), the status of the company as a
subsidiary, which is coded 1 and 0 otherwise (SUBSIDIARY), and the
number of the company's owners measured by the natural logarithm
of it (NO_OF_OWNERS).
The hypothesis regarding agency conflicts with lenders (H2) is
tested by the company's debt ratio, measured as total debt divided
by total assets (DEBT_RATIO), for which we predict a positive sign of
the regression coefficient.
To test H3, we constructed the binary variable IMPORTANCE
from the original five‐point scale response to a question on the
importance of financial statement information for managements'
own activities (1 = very unimportant, 5 = very important) and predict
a positive association between the voluntary audit decision and the
perception of management that financial statement information is
very important.
Furthermore, we consider the different professional qualifications
of those to whom financial accounting tasks are outsourced by specify-
ing three binary variables for which we assume a negative association
with the choice for a voluntary audit (H4). These are OUTSOURCE_EXP,
coded 1 if accounting tasks are outsourced to an external expert
(either a tax advisor or an auditor), OUTSOURCE_TAXADV, coded 1 if
accounting tasks are outsourced to an external tax advisor, and
OUTSOURCE_AUD, coded 1 if accounting tasks are outsourced to an
external auditor.We augment both logistic regression models (model 1 and model
2) with five control variables. The first represents company size, which
in previous literature is often used as a proxy for the separation of
ownership and control (Chow, 1982; Tauringana & Clarke, 2000) or
a measure of wealth value at risk (Abdel‐khalik, 1993; Collis, 2010),
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE). Beyond that,
we include one dummy variable that is coded 1 if company equity is
negative and 0 otherwise (NEGEQ). Finally, we control for industry
fixed effects by including binary industry indicators (INDUSTRY_2,
INDUSTRY_3, and INDUSTRY_4) for three of the four main industries
in our sample.5 | RESULTS
5.1 | Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics and univariate analyses are reported in Table 4.
Means, medians, and standard deviations are shown for the total sam-
ple and two subsamples regarding the decision to have a voluntary
audit (n = 49) or not (n = 356). The descriptive analysis shows that
our sample covers a wide range of small companies with balance sheet
totals ranging from €2,600 to €72,000,000 (with a mean value of
€1,893,000 and a median of €1,000,000) and with less than five
owners on average (median 2). Nine (2.2%) of the companies included
in our analysis operate in the legal form of an AG and 396 (97.8%) in
the legal form of a GmbH/GmbH & Co. KG. In our sample, the propor-
tion of AGs is somewhat higher than in the total population of small
companies (see Table 1). This can be explained by the stratified sam-
pling technique, since companies choosing the legal form of an AG
are usually also larger.5.1.1 | Voluntary audit ratio
It is worthwhile emphasizing the extremely low proportion of small
companies that opt for voluntary audit in our sample compared with
voluntary audit ratios documented in studies from other countries.
While we find that only 12% of the companies examined (49 from
405) report having a voluntary audit,10 the voluntary audit ratios
found in previous research from other countries ranged from 26% to
80% (see Table 5).11
The low audit ratio in Germany is noteworthy for two reasons.
First, in other studies (see Table 5) the size criteria of companies
selected are considerably lower than those in this study. Taking into
account research findings showing that size is one of the main drivers
of the voluntary audit decision (e.g., Collis, 2012; Collis et al., 2004;
Niemi et al., 2012), one would expect a much higher voluntary audit
ratio for the companies in our study. Second, owing to our stratified
sampling procedure, larger companies are overrepresented in our sam-
ple, which results in the voluntary audit ratio being even lower for the
whole population of small companies in Germany. When analyzing the
voluntary audit ratios for each stratum in our sample and weighing the
results proportionally, we find an average audit ratio of 5.3% (see
Table 6).
The considerably different results for Germany regarding the vol-
untary audit ratio show that findings from other countries regarding
TABLE 4 Descriptive statistics
Total (n = 405) Vol. audit (n = 49) No vol. audit (n = 356) Tests of
differences
p‐valueVariable M Mdn SD M Mdn SD M Mdn SD
NONOWNERMGT 0.340 0.000 0.388 0.653 0.750 0.371 0.297 0.000 0.371 <.001***
LEGAL 0.022 0.000 0.148 0.102 0.000 0.306 0.011 0.000 0.106 <.001***
BOARD 0.113 0.000 0.316 0.388 0.000 0.492 0.075 0.000 0.263 <.001***
NONMANDBOARD 0.091 0.000 0.288 0.286 0.000 0.456 0.065 0.000 0.246 <.001***
SUBSIDIARY 0.094 0.000 0.292 0.347 0.000 0.481 0.059 0.000 0.236 <.001***
NO_OF_OWNERS 0.656 0.693 0.784 1.002 0.693 1.147 0.608 0.693 0.709 .016**
FAMILY 0.763 1.000 0.426 0.429 0.000 0.500 0.809 1.000 0.394 <.001***
DEBT_RATIO 0.652 0.708 0.289 0.625 0.630 0.300 0.656 0.716 0.288 .762
IMPORTANCE 0.327 0.000 0.470 0.445 0.000 0.501 0.311 0.000 0.463 .078*
OUTSOURCE_EXP 0.921 1.000 0.270 0.857 1.000 0.354 0.930 1.000 0.256 .077*
OUTSOURCE_TAXADV 0.827 1.000 0.379 0.551 1.000 0.503 0.865 1.000 0.342 <.001***
OUTSOURCE_AUD 0.134 0.000 0.341 0.449 0.000 0.503 0.090 0.000 0.287 <.001***
SIZE 6.640 6.914 1.527 8.050 8.038 0.952 6.446 6.576 1.490 <.001***
NEGEQ 0.143 0.000 0.351 0.122 0.000 0.331 0.146 0.000 0.354 .658
INDUSTRY_1 0.067 0.000 0.250 0.143 0.000 0.354 0.056 0.000 0.231 .023**
INDUSTRY_2 0.163 0.000 0.370 0.204 0.000 0.407 0.157 0.000 0.365 .406
INDUSTRY_3 0.462 0.000 0.499 0.429 0.000 0.500 0.466 0.000 0.500 .619
INDUSTRY_4 0.309 0.000 0.463 0.224 0.000 0.422 0.320 0.000 0.467 .174
Statistical (two‐tailed) significance (p‐values) better than .01, .05 and .1 indicated by ***, **, and *.
For variable definitions, see Table 3. To examine the independence of the two subsamples (voluntary audit versus no voluntary audit) the chi‐square test
and the nonparametric Kolmogorov–Smirnov test were respectively performed in terms of the independent dichotomous categorical variables and the
independent variables measured at least on an ordinal scale.
WEIK ET AL. 511the decision to opt for voluntary audit cannot be transferred to Ger-
many without reflection. One reason for the low audit ratio in Ger-
many might be the absence of a mandatory audit history for small
German companies. As firms' decisions to opt for voluntary audit are
most likely influenced by previous practice (Niemi et al., 2012), studies
examining the years following transition to voluntary audit regimes
show very high audit ratios in the first year (Dedman et al., 2014).
However, it can also be seen that in subsequent years the voluntary
audit ratio decreases, revealing a trend away from voluntary audit
(Dedman et al., 2014; Ojala et al., 2016). Thus, questionnaire surveys
(Collis, 2010; Collis et al., 2004; Niemi et al., 2012) analyzing voluntary
audit decisions based on managers' willingness to opt for future volun-
tary audit while auditing is still mandatory for them may overestimate
the benefits of a voluntary audit.5.1.2 | Drivers of voluntary audit
Table 4 reports the chi‐square test and the nonparametric (Kolmogo-
rov–Smirnov) test conducted in terms of the independent dichoto-
mous categorical variables (LEGAL, BOARD, NONMANDBOARD,
SUBSIDIARY, FAMILY, IMPORTANCE, OUTSOURCE_EXP,
OUTSOURCE_TAXADV, OUTSOURCE_AUD, NEGEQ, INDUSTRY) and
the independent variables measured at least on an ordinal scale
(NONOWNERMGT, NO_OF_OWNERS, DEBT_RATIO, SIZE) to examine
the two subsamples' independence.
Based on our univariate results, we can provide initial evidence
that agency conflicts with owners affect the decision on whether or
not to have a voluntary audit as all of our agency variables arestatistically significant at the .01 level (NONOWNERMGT, LEGAL,
BOARD, NONMANDBOARD, SUBSIDIARY, and FAMILY) or at least at
the .05 level (NO_OF_OWNERS). From Table 4, we can see that those
companies opting for a voluntary audit have a higher proportion of
owners who are not involved in management (65.3% versus 29.7%),
operate more often in the legal form of an AG (10.2% versus 1.1%),
more often have a supervisory board/nonmandated supervisory board
(38.8%/28.6% versus 7.5%/6.5%), are more often subsidiaries (34.7%
versus 5.9%), are less often family firms (42.9% versus 80.9%), and
have a higher number of owners (1.0 versus 0.6). By contrast, agency
conflicts with lenders (DEBT_RATIO) do not seem to drive the volun-
tary audit decision. Regarding the debt ratio, companies that opt for
a voluntary audit are not significantly different from those that do
not choose to have a voluntary audit (62.5% versus 65.6%). The vari-
able IMPORTANCE is significant at the .10 level, indicating that man-
agers who decide to have voluntary audits more often rate financial
statement information as very important for their management activi-
ties than those who take advantage of the audit exemption (44.5%
versus 31.1%). The variable OUTSOURCE_EXP (capturing both
outsourcing accounting tasks to a tax advisor and outsourcing
accounting tasks to an auditor) is significant at the .10 level, showing
that outsourcing of accounting tasks (bookkeeping, preparation of
financial statements, preparation of tax returns) is less common among
companies that report having had voluntary audits (85.7% versus
93%). Regarding the outsourcing of accounting tasks, the test statistics
also provide first univariate evidence that for the voluntary audit
decision it matters to whom the accounting tasks are outsourced.
While it can be seen that outsourcing to an external tax advisor
TABLE 5 Proportion of companies that opt for voluntary audit in other major studies
Reference Country VAR (%) Size of companies investigated
Carey et al. (2000) AUS 46 n/a
Carey and Tanewski (2013) AUS 26 Farm businesses with estimated value of agricultural operations of
22,500 AUD or more
Senkow, Rennie, Rennie,
and Wong (2001)
CAN 74 Revenue > 10,000,000 CAD
Total assets > 5,000,000 CAD
Collis (2010) DNK 41a Companies that met any two of the following three criteria:
turnover ≤ €7,300,000
balance sheet total ≤ €3,650,000
average number of employees ≤ 50
Niemi et al. (2012) FIN 80a Number of employees ≤ 10
Ojala et al. (2016) FIN 27b Companies that did not exceed any two of the following three
size criteria for two consecutive years:
annual turnover ≤ €200,000
total assets ≤ €100,000
number of employees ≤ 3
Collis (2010) UK 43a Companies that met all of the following three criteria:
turnover ≤ €7,300,000
balance sheet total ≤ €3,650,000
average number of employees ≤ 50
Collis (2012) UK 39 Companies that classified as small based on the respondents'
answers regarding the audit exemption in 2006. Thereby, the
following criteria were relevant for the audit exemption in 2006:
turnover ≤ £5,600,000
balance sheet total ≤ £2,800,000
average number of employees ≤ 50
Collis et al. (2004) UK 68a Companies that met the following three size criteria:
turnover ≤ £4,200,000
balance sheet total ≤ £2,100,000
average number of employees ≤ 50
Dedman et al. (2014) UK 62c Companies with either
sales > £1,000,000 or
total assets > £1,400,000 in 2003; and sales < £5,600,000 and
total assets < £2,800,000 in the years 2003 and 2004
Seow (2001) UK 53 Companies that potentially met the SSRA turnover and balance
sheet limits. These were:
turnover ≤ £90,000
balance sheet total ≤ £1,400,000
Tauringana and Clarke (2000) UK 35 Companies that met the following two size criteria:
turnover ≤ £90,000
balance sheet total ≤ £1,400,000
VAR, voluntary audit ratio; SSRA = Statement of Standard for Reporting Accountants.
aThe proportion is not based on an actual decision, but on the intention of the manager if the company would be exempt from a mandatory audit.
bIn total, but the proportion declines: 2008, 32%; 2009, 27%; 2010, 23%.
cIn total, but the proportion declines: 2004, 71%; 2005, 60%; 2006, 52%.
TABLE 6 Voluntary audit ratio
Total population 733,949
Size class 1 2 3
Stratum defined by total assets (TA) TA ≤ €350,000 €350,000 < TA ≤ €2,000,000 TA > €2,000,000
Number of companies by stratum 424,391 236,590 72,968
Proportion of total population (%) 57.8 32.2 9.9
Number of companies randomly selected 2,000 2,000 2,000
Usable responses by stratum 112 152 141
Number of companies opt for a voluntary audit 1 10 38
Voluntary audit ratio by stratum (%) 0.9 6.6 27.0
Voluntary audit ratio by stratum weighted (%) 0.5 (57.8% × 0.9%) 2.1 (32.2% × 6.6%) 2.7 (9.9% × 27%)
Voluntary audit ratio of the total population (%) 5.3
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WEIK ET AL. 513(OUTSOURCE_TAXADV) is to a significant extent negatively associated
with decisions to opt for a voluntary audit (at the .01 level; 55.1% ver-
sus 86.5%), outsourcing to an external auditor (OUTSOURCE_AUD) is
to a significant extent positively related to the voluntary audit decision
(at the .01 level; 44.9% versus 9%). From our control variables, size is
significant at the .01 level and one industry variable (public and private
utilities) is significant at the .05 level. Thus, companies that choose to
have a voluntary audit are on average larger (8.05 versus 6.45) and
operate more often in the public and private utilities industry (14.3%
versus 5.6%).5.2 | Correlations
Table 7 provides both Pearson and Spearman correlations between
the variables tested in the binary logistic regression models.
As predicted, our variables regarding agency conflicts with owners
correlate with the voluntary audit decision significantly positively
(NONOWNERMGT, LEGAL, BOARD, NONMANDBOARD, SUBSIDIARY,
NO_OF_OWNERS), apart from the status as a family firm (FAMILY),
for which the coefficients are significantly negative. In terms of agency
conflicts with debt providers, the estimated correlation for the debt
ratio (DEBT_RATIO) is, in contrast to our prediction, insignificant. The
variable related to the importance of financial statement information
for management activities (IMPORTANCE) correlates significantly pos-
itively with voluntary audit, as expected. While the estimated correla-
tions between the voluntary audit choice and outsourcing accounting
tasks to an external expert (OUTSOURCE_EXP) as well as the
outsourcing of accounting tasks to a tax advisor
(OUTSOURCE_TAXADV) are, as predicted, significant and negative,
the outsourcing of accounting tasks to an auditor (OUTSOURCE_AUD)
is significantly positive and, therefore, inconsistent with our hypothe-
sized direction. Regarding the control variables, firm size (SIZE) and
one industry variable (INDUSTRY_1) are positively correlated, while
the others (NEGEQ, INDUSTRY_2 to INDUSTRY_4) are insignificant.
As all of the correlation coefficients are less than .7 (except for BOARD
and NONMANDBOARD, which are, however, tested in two different
models), there is no major overlap indicated in the independent
variables' predictive power (multicollinearity) (Kervin, 1992).5.3 | Logistic regression
The results of the two binary logistic regression models are shown in
Tables 8 and 9, each presenting three different versions capturing
the different professional qualifications of those to whom financial
accounting tasks are outsourced (A: OUTSOURCE_EXP; B:
OUTSOURCE_TAXADV; and C: OUTSOURCE_AUD). Also reported are
the variance inflation factors VIFs for the variables included in our
binary logistic regression model as a further check for potential
multicollinearity. As these VIFs are clearly below 10.0, we have no rea-
son to suspect that results were affected by serious multicollinearity
(Niemi et al., 2012; Ojala et al., 2016).
5.3.1 | Results for model 1
The coefficients of determination measured by pseudo R2 indicate
that the three versions of model 1 explain 52% (model 1A:OUTSOURCE_EXP), 60% (model 1B: OUTSOURCE_TAXADV), and 58%
(model 1C: OUTSOURCE_AUD) of the variance.
Regarding H1, only two (NONOWNERMGT and SUBSIDIARY) of
the six variables measuring agency conflicts with owners are signifi-
cant (p < .01 or p < .05 respectively) in all three versions of model 1,
and their coefficients carry the expected positive sign. This suggests
that due to information asymmetries the demand for voluntary audit
increases, the greater the proportion of company owners who are
not involved in management, which is in line with previous literature
(Collis, 2010; Seow, 2001; Tauringana & Clarke, 2000). Extending pre-
vious research and consistent with findings from listed companies
(Hay et al., 2008), we also find that voluntarily audited companies
are more likely to be subsidiaries, confirming that the existence of a
parent company increases the demand for an external audit. The sig-
nificant positive coefficient documented for LEGAL in two of our
regression versions (model 1B and model 1C; p < .10) has not been
documented in prior research. As predicted, our findings show that a
company operating in the legal form of an AG is more likely to opt
for a voluntary audit. This is because shareholders of an AG have less
comprehensive information rights than shareholders of a GmbH/
GmbH & Co. KG. So, there is evidence to support rejection of the null
hypotheses for H1a, H1b, and H1e. However, this is not so in the case
of the null hypotheses for BOARD (H1c), NO_OF_OWNERS (H1f), and
FAMILY (H1g); in other words, we do not find evidence that firms
opt for a voluntary audit of their financial statements if they have a
supervisory board, if they have a larger number of owners, or if they
are a family‐run business.
Additionally, we do not find support for debt (DEBT_RATIO) being
a driver of the voluntary audit decision. So, there is no evidence
supporting rejection of the null hypothesis for H2 in any model. This
finding differs slightly from Dedman et al. (2014), who, using data from
the UK, find weak support for leverage as a voluntary audit driver, but
is consistent with Niemi et al. (2012), who do not find support using
Finnish data. Put together, these results suggest that within traditional
bank‐dominated economies such as Germany and Finland, so far as
their small and private enterprise customers are concerned, banks
have different monitoring mechanisms that substitute for or are more
cost efficient than a voluntary audit. For example, in Germany, banks
often rely on tax financial statements for their credit decisions, espe-
cially for smaller companies (Haller et al., 2008; Oehler, 2006) and
may due to the strong alignment between financial accounting and
taxation benefit from tax enforcement.
Regarding H3, the results for IMPORTANCE are significant in all
three versions of our model 1 (model 1A and model 1B p < .01; model
1C p < .05) with the predicted positive sign, indicating that if financial
statement information is important for management activities, then
managers opt to have their companies' financial statements voluntarily
audited. This finding is in line with previous literature, where an audit
is interpreted as a check of information provided (Collis, 2010, 2012;
Collis et al., 2004; Niemi et al., 2012).
Regarding H4a, the result for OUTSOURCE_EXP is only weakly sig-
nificant (p < .10) with a negative sign, indicating that firms which out-
source financial accounting tasks (such as bookkeeping, financial
statement preparation, or tax return preparation) to an external expert
(tax advisor and/or auditor) are less likely to opt for voluntary audit.
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TABLE 8 Binary logit regression, model 1 (n = 405)
Variable Expected sign
Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C
Coeff. p‐value VIF Coeff. p‐value VIF Coeff. p‐value VIF
Hypotheses H1a–H1g
NONOWNERMGT + 1.841 .003*** 1.580 1.619 .016** 1.556 1.857 .005*** 1.561
LEGAL + 1.518 .120 1.341 1.854 .067* 1.381 1.670 .094* 1.409
BOARD + 0.474 .424 1.717 0.696 .274 1.753 0.155 .802 1.707
SUBSIDIARY + 1.275 .015** 1.289 1.392 .011** 1.290 1.440 .012** 1.329
NO_OF_OWNERS + 0.116 .599 1.596 0.320 .184 1.687 0.132 .562 1.671
FAMILY ? −0.262 .625 1.734 −0.297 .598 1.671 −0.498 .368 1.687
Hypothesis H2
DEBT_RATIO + −0.486 .517 1.238 −0.249 .763 1.273 −0.488 .539 1.271
Hypothesis H3
IMPORTANCE + 1.355 .006*** 1.435 1.349 .009*** 1.420 1.084 .042** 1.436
Hypotheses H4a–H4c
OUTSOURCE_EXP − −1.262 .080* 1.327
OUTSOURCE_TAXADV − −2.585 <.001*** 1.465
OUTSOURCE_AUD − 2.105 <.001*** 1.148
Control variables
SIZE + 1.445 <.001*** 1.161 1.558 <.001*** 1.230 1.371 <.001*** 1.152
NEGEQ ? −0.351 .647 1.362 −1.088 .207 1.523 −0.746 .367 1.385
INDUSTRY_2 ? 0.691 .408 2.882 0.937 .300 2.895 0.049 .953 2.330
INDUSTRY_3 ? −0.566 .433 3.195 −0.693 .365 3.119 −1.212 .086* 2.785
INDUSTRY_4 ? −0.684 .354 2.872 −0.744 .347 2.783 −1.225 .097* 2.537
Constant ? −12.725 <.001*** −13.136 <.001*** −13.027 <.001***
−2 log‐likelihood 171.610 147.585 153.793
R2 (Cox and Snell) .270 .312 .301
R2 (Nagelkerke) .516 .597 .577
Statistical (two‐tailed) significance (p‐values) better than .01, .05 and .1 indicated by ***, **, and *.
For variable definitions, see Table 3.
WEIK ET AL. 515This suggests that the involvement of an external expert provides
additional assurance for the integrity of financial information and,
therefore, substitutes for an external audit. When analyzing this sub-
stitution effect with more detailed differentiation between
outsourcing to a tax advisor (H4b) or an auditor (H4c), we find for
OUTSOURCE_TAXADV a strong significant negative association
(p < .001) and for OUTSOURCE_AUD a strong significant positive asso-
ciation (p < .001). While the result for outsourcing accounting tasks to
a tax advisor is in line with our prediction suggesting a substitution
effect when an external expert is involved, the result for outsourcing
accounting tasks to an auditor is in contradiction with our hypothesis.
If companies follow the independence requirements of German com-
pany law, auditors or other persons with whom they jointly exercise
their profession are not allowed to perform an audit of the companies'
financial statements if they are involved in bookkeeping or the prepa-
ration of these companies' financial statements (threat of self‐review)
according to § 319 (3) HGB. However, since we do not have access to
the identities of individuals in our sample, we cannot exclude the pos-
sibility of this requirement being violated. Our finding for outsourcing
accounting tasks to an auditor is in line with that from Niemi et al.
(2012), who argue that problems of moral hazard will arise when
accounting tasks are outsourced to an external auditor, thus inducing
a demand for additional assurance. However, this argument wouldhold for outsourcing to a tax advisor as well as an auditor. An alterna-
tive explanation is that, for small companies, tax‐related services are
the most widely used business services provided (Leung, Raar, &
Tangey, 2008), and owing to a tax advisor's specialization it is possible
that they could have a competitive advantage over the auditor provid-
ing tax‐related services (Niemi et al., 2012). Accordingly, when the
manager of a small business has to decide whether to engage a tax
advisor or an auditor, it is more likely that they will choose a tax advi-
sor unless they value an auditor's more comprehensive professional
qualification. This will be the case especially if they find financial state-
ment information important for their management activities, as indi-
cated by our descriptive statistics (Table 7). Thus, in line with the
argumentation for listed companies on the complementary role of
auditing (e.g., Hay et al., 2008; Knechel & Willekens, 2006; Zaman
et al., 2011), one could expect that managers who value the additional
professional qualification of an auditor when outsourcing accounting
tasks also appreciate the additional assurance of an audit. In summary,
regarding outsourcing as a driver of voluntary audit, our results sup-
port only our hypotheses H4a and H4b but not H4c.
From the control variables in all three versions of our model 1,
SIZE is highly significant (p < .01), with the expected positive sign of
the coefficient indicating that larger firms tend to opt more often for
voluntary audit. Additionally, two industry variables (INDUSTRY_3
TABLE 9 Binary logit regression, model 2 (n = 405)
Variable Expected sign
Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C
Coeff. p‐value VIF Coeff. p‐value VIF Coeff. p‐value VIF
Hypotheses H1a–H1g
NONOWNERMGT + 1.838 .003*** 1.580 1.615 .016** 1.557 1.860 .005*** 1.564
LEGAL + 1.964 .036** 1.220 2.529 .009*** 1.253 1.812 .052* 1.233
NONMANDBOARD + 0.400 .492 1.435 0.638 .310 1.454 0.115 .852 1.400
SUBSIDIARY + 1.280 .015** 1.288 1.397 .011** 1.291 1.442 .012** 1.328
NO_OF_OWNERS + 0.119 .590 1.599 0.322 .183 1.691 0.135 .555 1.675
FAMILY ? −0.292 .581 1.706 −0.321 .565 1.649 −0.511 .353 1.671
Hypothesis H2
DEBT_RATIO + −0.501 .503 1.234 −0.263 .750 1.271 −0.494 .534 1.268
Hypothesis H3
IMPORTANCE + 1.357 .006*** 1.443 1.348 .009*** 1.426 1.087 .042** 1.440
Hypotheses H4a–H4c
OUTSOURCE_EXP − −1.248 .084* 1.324
OUTSOURCE_TAXADV − −2.582 <.001*** 1.466
OUTSOURCE_AUD − 2.108 <.001*** 1.147
Control variables
SIZE + 1.448 <.001*** 1.163 1.560 <.001*** 1.229 1.375 <.001*** 1.154
NEGEQ ? −0.357 .643 1.365 −1.093 .206 1.525 −0.754 .363 1.389
INDUSTRY_2 ? 0.688 .408 2.880 0.935 .301 2.897 0.050 .952 2.332
INDUSTRY_3 ? −0.568 .431 3.190 −0.695 .363 3.122 −1.213 .086* 2.786
INDUSTRY_4 ? −0.698 .343 2.862 −0.756 .338 2.788 −1.228 .096* 2.536
Constant ? −12.720 <.001*** −13.115 <.001*** −13.039 <.001***
−2 log‐likelihood 171.786 147.762 153.822
R2 (Cox and Snell) .269 .311 .301
R2 (Nagelkerke) .516 .597 .577
Statistical (two‐tailed) significance (p‐values) better than .01, .05 and .1 indicated by ***, **, and *.
For variable definitions, see Table 3.
516 WEIK ET AL.and INDUSTRY_4) are weakly significant (p < .10) in only one of the
three versions.
5.3.2 | Results for model 2
To test for auditing's possible substitutive role in the case of mandated
governance mechanisms, we rerun our regression from model 1
replacing the variable BOARD with the variable NONMANDBOARD,
whilst all other variables remain the same (model 2). From results for
the three versions of model 2 (see Table 9), it can be seen that there
is no change in pseudo R2 nor significance of the variables tested in
the three versions of model 1, with the exception of LEGAL. Compared
with model 1, in all three versions of model 2 the variable LEGAL
shows a higher significance, while NONMANDBOARD, as well as
BOARD, is insignificant in the first model. Thus, there is no evidence
to support rejection of the null hypothesis for H1d, implying that we
cannot show a complementary role for voluntary audit if a
nonmandated board exists.5.4 | Robustness check
Owing to our research method, we have to take into account a poten-
tial nonresponse bias. We test in two ways, therefore, to check
whether or not the responsiveness of late respondents, as a proxyfor nonrespondents (Lehman, 1963; Niemi et al., 2012; Wallace &
Mellor, 1988), differs significantly from early respondents. In the first
step we augment our binary logistic regression models with the vari-
able RESPONSE_TIME, which measures the number of days elapsed
before respondents returned the survey questionnaire. Results
(untabulated) show that the regression coefficient RESPONSE_TIME
is not significant in any model; moreover, other results are not qualita-
tively affected by this inclusion. In the second step, we separate our
sample using RESPONSE_TIME from the median into early and late
respondents; using a chi‐square test (untabulated), we find no signifi-
cant difference in the distribution of opting for voluntary audit or
not. Summarizing, there is no evidence to suggest that our results
are significantly affected by a nonresponse bias.
Furthermore, one could argue that the importance of financial
accounting information for management activities (IMPORTANCE)
and the decision to opt for voluntary audit might be different mea-
sures of the same attitude, which would imply problems of reverse
causality. Since we have data from only one period we cannot perform
strong causality tests requiring data from various time points. How-
ever, to address the potential effects of managers' attitudes to volun-
tary audit and the importance of accounting information, we use an
approach similar to Niemi et al. (2012) and regress IMPORTANCE on
the independent variables of our three models. Our results
WEIK ET AL. 517(untabulated) do not give grounds to suspect the influence of
endogeneity to any significant extent as R2 is considerably lower
(.103, .100, and .110) and the regression coefficients that were previ-
ously significant are now insignificant (with the exception of
NONOWNERMGT p < .10 and SIZE p < .10 or p < .05). We can con-
clude, therefore, that VOLAUDIT and IMPORTANCE are not driven by
the same factors.6 | SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study focuses on the drivers of voluntary audit in German private
companies. Germany provides a very different institutional setting
than exists in other countries, as covered by prior literature, because
there is no history of a mandatory audit for small companies. As a con-
sequence, audit decisions are not influenced by a previously mandated
audit and the German setting can, consequently, provide answers to
the question of what ultimately could happen to those countries
where there is a “trend away from the voluntary audit” (Dedman
et al., 2014). Additionally, Germany provides a potentially worthwhile
setting within which to examine the drivers of voluntary audit because
it has the highest criteria for audit exemption in Europe, and thus
arguably makes possible the broadest examination of private company
voluntary audit choices. Conversely, in countries where a high per-
centage of private companies are statutorily audited (e.g., Finland
and Sweden), they cannot signal their willingness to be voluntarily
audited.
To analyze the drivers of the voluntary audit decision, we gath-
ered information from small private companies in Germany regarding
their financial statements prepared for the financial year ending
2011 from a questionnaire survey, which provided 405 usable
responses.
We find that voluntary audits are performed much less often in
Germany than they are in other countries covered by prior studies
(e.g., Collis, 2012; Collis et al., 2004; Dedman et al., 2014; Niemi
et al., 2012). This may relate to the absence of a mandatory audit his-
tory for small companies in Germany and the country's generous audit
exemption regime granted to small firms. Since previous habits are
most likely to influence the voluntary audit decision in studies from
other countries with a previously mandatory audit regime, managers
in Germany are expected to value the costs and benefits resulting
from a voluntary audit differently. However, it has to be considered
that cost–benefit considerations might be different between first‐time
and ongoing voluntary audits. Because we cannot examine such an
effect with our data, we leave this for future research. Furthermore,
it is possible that media attention surrounding Directive 2013/34/
EU affected the answers to our survey questions. This has to be taken
into account when interpreting our results.
Regarding the drivers of voluntary audit, in line with evidence
from prior studies covering other countries we find that a higher pro-
portion of company owners who are not involved in management
increases the likelihood of an auditor being hired voluntarily. This find-
ing is consistent with an interpretation that agency problems are pres-
ent between the owners and outside managers of small companies.
Extending previous research, we find that voluntarily auditedcompanies are more likely to be subsidiaries, supporting evidence
from listed companies that the existence of a major shareholder
increases demand for external auditing services. Furthermore, our
finding that companies in the legal form of an AG are more likely to
opt for voluntary audit provides evidence that information
asymmetries between managers and shareholders depend on a
company's legal form. In contrast to prior research (Dedman et al.,
2014), we do not find evidence that firms opt for voluntary audit of
their financial statements if they have a larger number of owners.
Additionally, we cannot corroborate findings that the status as a family
firm impacts on a firm's voluntary audit decision. This is in contrast to
results from Collis et al. (2004) and Collis (2010), but in line with the
later study of Collis (2012). Furthermore, extending prior research on
listed firms, we cannot provide support for the argument that the gen-
eral existence of either a supervisory board or a nonmandated super-
visory board having an impact on the voluntary audit decision. Nor can
we confirm the claim that leverage could be a voluntary audit driver
among small companies in Germany. This finding is significant, in that
it differs only slightly from that of Dedman et al. (2014), who from UK
data find weak support for leverage as a voluntary audit driver, but is
consistent with Niemi et al. (2012), who do not find support using
Finnish data. Put together, these results suggest that in traditional
bank‐dominated economies, such as Germany and Finland, banks have
different monitoring mechanisms for their small and private enterprise
customers that either substitute for or are more cost efficient than a
voluntary audit. However, in this context, the number of lenders might
be another factor impacting the need for a voluntary audit. Literature
suggests that borrowing from a single lender improves a lender's con-
trol (Petersen & Rajan, 1994), which in turn could decrease demand
for an audit. As we do not have any data on the number of lenders
used by our sample firms, we leave it for future research to examine
in more detail the impact of a firm's relationship with its lenders on
the demand for a voluntary audit. Consistent with other studies (Collis,
2010, 2012; Collis et al., 2004; Niemi et al., 2012) in the field of vol-
untary audit, we find that an audit could be interpreted as a check
of information provided measured by the importance of financial
statement information for management activities. We find support
for an inverse relation between the use of voluntary audits and the
outsourcing of accounting tasks to an external tax advisor, suggesting
that the involvement of an external tax advisor in accounting tasks
substitutes for an audit. This is in line with earlier evidence from Niemi
et al. (2012), who find that companies which consider tax advisory ser-
vices from an external accountant to be beneficial are less likely to hire
an auditor if the audit is non‐mandatory. In contrast to the substitu-
tion view, but consistent with findings from previous research (Niemi
et al., 2012), we find a positive relationship between the outsourcing
of accounting tasks to an external auditor and the voluntary audit
decision. This finding suggests that managers valuing the additional
professional qualification of an auditor when outsourcing accounting
tasks may also appreciate the additional assurance provided by an
audit, indicating a complementary role of auditing found in previous
research for listed companies (e.g., Hay et al., 2008; Knechel &
Willekens, 2006; Zaman et al., 2011).
Our study provides three major contributions. The first lies in val-
idation of earlier research findings from other jurisdictions in a very
518 WEIK ET AL.different institutional setting. In the absence of a statutory audit his-
tory for the companies considered, their decisions, unlike those in
other studies, are not influenced by a previously mandated audit
regime. Our second contribution is taking a more profound approach
than earlier studies (Niemi et al., 2012) in examining the link between
a voluntary audit decision and the outsourcing of accounting tasks.
Considering the different professional qualifications of those to whom
the accounting tasks are outsourced, we add to existing literature
regarding the complementary or substitutive role of auditing. As a
third contribution, our study examines drivers of voluntary audit
related to agency conflicts with owners (the legal form of the com-
pany, the existence of a supervisory board, and the status as a subsid-
iary) that have not been documented in prior research. Investigating
the impact of nonmandated supervisory boards on voluntary audit
decisions in small companies, we add to the literature (on listed firms)
discussing the complementary/substitutive relationship between gov-
ernance mechanisms and external auditing.
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ENDNOTES
1 At the time of this study the size thresholds were total assets
€4,840,000, turnover €9,680,000, and average number of employees
50.
2 There is, for example, no special professional organization for people
dealing with accounting and who are not at the same time professional
auditors (Haller, 2003).
3 Prior studies often included only independent companies (e.g., Collis,
2012; Collis et al., 2004; Dedman et al., 2014) in their samples, because
subsidiaries are in other jurisdictions often not eligible to take advan-
tage of the audit exemption, which, however, is not the case in
Germany.
4 Even though the audit report on the consolidated financial statements
also has to consider subsidiaries' financial statements, this does not
automatically imply an audit of the individual financial statements of
the subsidiaries included in the consolidated financial statements
because of materiality (Baetge, Stellbrink, & Janko, 2011; Schmidt &
Almeling, 2014).
5 After discussing the questionnaire with four experts in the auditing pro-
fession, it was piloted with five managers of small companies; see
Appendix for an extract of the translated questionnaire showing the
questions regarding the variables analyzed in this study.
6 In compliance with the size criteria of the German Commercial Code, a
company is defined as small if it does not exceed more than one of the
following thresholds by the year ending in 2011: total assets
€4,840,000, turnover €9,680,000, and 50 employees.
7 In total, we used three different size classes. For details see Table 2.
8 The proportion of imputed data is 1.36%.
9 It is a family firm if one or two people and their relatives (one or two
families) hold together more than 50% of the voting shares.10 Further 4 per cent of the companies report having a voluntary review of
their financial statements and 34 per cent report making use of a
compilation of their financial statements with the practitioner
providing limited or reasonable assurance on underlying records and
documentation.
11 However, it must be noted that previous UK studies using the FAME
database possibly overestimate voluntary audit ratios (Collis, 2010;
Collis et al., 2004; Dedman et al., 2014). As these studies use for their
sample selection the amount of turnover—for instance, disclosed in
companies' financial statements, which is a voluntary disclosure—they
automatically eliminate the vast majority of small companies that do
not opt to report such data. Since the voluntary disclosure is likely to
be positively correlated with other types of voluntary behavior (such
as a voluntary audit), the audit ratios derived might be biased (Collis,
2012) and they could, therefore, actually be lower.
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comdirect bank AG, Quickborn.Extract of translated questionnaire showing variables analyzed
1.1 Who did the company's bookkeeping for the financial year 2011?
○ External tax consultant
○ External top‐tier or second‐tier auditor
○ External accountant
○ Employee of the company
○ Someone else
Who did the company's tax return preparation for the financial year 20
○ External tax consultant
○ External top‐tier or second‐tier auditor
○ Employee of the company
○ Someone else
Who did the company's financial statement preparation for the financia
○ External tax consultant
○ External top‐tier or second‐tier auditor
○ Employee of the company
○ Someone else
1.3 How important are financial statement information for your manageme
○ Very important
○ Important
○ Neither important nor not important
○ Not important
○ Not important at all
○ Assessment not possible
2.1 Was the company's 2011 financial statement audited by an auditor? (If yo
report.)
○ No
○ Yes, with issuance of an attestation of an audit review
○ Yes, with issuance of an audit report
3.3 How many owners did the company have in 2011?
How many managers did the company have in 2011?
How many owners were also managers in 2011?
Was the company a family firm in 2011? (A company is a family firm if o
shares of the company.)
○ Yes
○ NoBrigitte Eierle is Professor of International Accounting and
Auditing at the University of Bamberg.
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Tampere and Professor of Practice in International Accounting at
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l year 2011?
nt activities?
u are not sure which type of audit was carried out you can check up your audit
_________
_________
_________
ne or two persons and their relatives together hold at least 50% of the voting
(Continued)
Extract of translated questionnaire showing variables analyzed
3.4 Was the company included in a 2011 consolidated financial statement as a parent company or as a subsidiary? (A company is assumed to be a
subsidiary if another company holds at least 50% of the voting shares.)
○ No, the company was not included in a consolidated financial statement
○ Yes, the company was included in a consolidated financial statement as a parent company.
○ Yes, the company was included in a consolidated financial statement as a subsidiary
3.5 Was there a Board of Directors or an Advisory Board in the company in 2011?
○ Yes
○ No
Was there any other control committee in the company in 2011?
○ Yes
○ No
4. Financial statement information (Please state the following financial data for the financial year 2011 in thousand euros.)
Total assets (k€) _________
Was there a deficit not covered by equity at the end of the financial year 2011?
○ Yes
○ No
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